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The Sedimentation of the Social: Spiral Jetty and the Ruins of the Death Drive 
  
  Theories like things are also abandoned. That theories are eternal is 




To describe Spiral Jetty (1970) as a well-trodden example of twentieth-century art is 
something of an ironic understatement. For postmodern writers and critics, as Caroline A. 
Jones has already argued, the significance of this canonical work stems from its much touted 
inaccessibility.
1
 From the late 1970s until the late 1990s the dissemination of Smithson‘s 
submerged earthwork via its cinematic, photographic and textual versions posited it as the 
paradigm case for the Linguistic Turn‘s reduction of artistic production to forms of ‗writing‘.
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The suggestion that there is still more to say about Spiral Jetty does not herald yet another 
chapter of dry discursivity in postmodernism‘s history of art. Over the past twenty years 
numerous scholars, most notably Jack Flam (1996), Jones (1995), Lynne Cooke and Karen 
Kelly (2005), and Ann Reynolds (2003, 2005), have sought to affirm the material nature of 
Smithson‘s dematerialised practice.
3
 This essay takes up this affirmation by situating Spiral 
Jetty‘s emergence on the Great Salt Lake, Utah as an unfolding of materially bound 
conceptual and historical forces. As anthropologist Tim Ingold has so consistently and 
eloquently argued, such modes of artistic inquiry do not proceed from predetermined ideas 
that impose logic on form. Rather, he explains ‗thought goes along with, and continually 
answers to, the fluxes and flows of the materials with which we work.‘
4
 To conceive of the 
material production of art as the outcome of ignorance, the unthought, and the not known is 
to open up a critical space from which to say something new with Spiral Jetty.  
The primary aim of this essay is to think through the making of Spiral Jetty to interrogate its 
discursive operations. As Flam notes, Smithson took great delight in contradiction. It is my 
contention that attention to the differing material operations of Spiral Jetty destabilizes one of 
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the key concepts that underpinned the work‘s production and subsequent criticism. That 
concept is Sigmund Freud‘s psychoanalytic thesis of the death drive (1920). Smithson drew 
on Freud‘s idea to foreground the ‗time‘ of the artist in ‗contact with matter‘ and so resist art 
criticism‘s preoccupation with finished artworks. Close attention to Smithson‘s works 
between 1966-1967 illuminate the confluence of psychoanalysis‘ critique of civilisation and 
twentieth century representations of pharonic Egypt precisely at the moment that he first 
conceived of a remote monument. In contrast to Smithson‘s interest in the ancient cultures of 
the Aztecs and the Mayan‘s, Egypt has been accorded little critical attention to date. What 
makes it worthy of further consideration is that the representation of Egypt as an exhausted 
civilisation, which framed Smithson‘s research resources, had been a construction of 
colonialism.  
Recent excavations and postcolonial scholarship have revealed the profound 
misrepresentation of ancient and modern Egyptian culture by nineteenth and twentieth 
century Egyptology. An analysis of this ideological fallacy and the frame it constructed for 
Smithson‘s research materials offers an opportunity to pit Spiral Jetty against Freudian 
psychoanalysis‘ insistence that humans are inherently aggressive, asocial, discrete beings. 
The complex social relations necessary to the construction of Egypt‘s pharonic monuments 
and their subsequent value for that nation‘s indigenous population draw the cooperative 
production of Spiral Jetty into sharper relief. The writing of anthropologist Tim Ingold brings 
these social relations to the foreground of Spiral Jetty’s operations to reveal the limits of the 
thesis of the death drive‘s which cannot be borne out either by the making or experience of 
Smithson‘s artwork.      
I The time of the artist and the social 
For too long the artist has been estranged from his own ―time.‖ Critics, by focussing on the 






This essay begins with two photographs taken by Gianfranco Gorgoni at the time of Spiral 
Jetty‘s making in 1970. The first shows Smithson and Richard Serra on site, considering a 
sketch for the proposed earthwork (fig.1). The second shows Smithson smiling up at Grant 
(Boozie) Busenbark, the Caterpillar driver responsible for much of Spiral Jetty‘s construction 
(Fig.2). Both photographs accompany the essay ‗Building the Jetty‘ written in 2005 by Bob 
Phillips, the foreman of Parson Construction Company who oversaw the making of Spiral 
Jetty.
6
 These photographs are extraordinary because of the nature of the project, but they are 
also quite ordinary: Serra eats a sandwich and Boozie grins at the camera. Unlike other 
photographs that Gorgoni took in Utah (fig.3) they do not embody the entropic vision of art, 
life, the universe, and everything that has driven the histories written for this artwork. Instead 
they belong to the category of events recounted by Smithson in his text of 1972, which 
Margaret Iversen dismissed in 2007 as the ‗pedestrian details‘ of Spiral Jetty‘s beginnings.
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Within Smithson‘s economy of matter, process, and time, however, I would argue that all of 
the details of Spiral Jetty‘s making are worthy of critical attention. The social relationships 
necessary to the work‘s construction make these photographs ordinary, but they also make 
them remarkable. 
As early as 1995, writing prior to the re-emergence of the Jetty from the Great Salt Lake, 
Caroline A. Jones reminded audiences that even dematerialised works of art are indebted to 
material decision making processes. Her significant corrective countered arguments based on 
the intangibility of the earthwork with the fact of its ‗madeness‘, a position which necessarily 
recognised the collaborative, social foundations of Spiral Jetty‘s construction:  
‗What exhilarates us [about Spiral Jetty] is not just the ―breathless experience of horizontality,‖ but the 
dramatic expenditure of capital, labor, and low-level technology marshalled for the purposes of art, the 






Her argument reasserted the physical experience of the work as recounted by British critic 
and curator Lawrence Alloway, which revelled in the monumental physicality of Spiral 
Jetty‘s making:  
‗It is 1,500 feet from the top of the ridge out to the tip of the coil which measures about 15 feet across, 
just enough to support the trucks. The fill is made up of 3,500 cubic yards of boulders and earth; each 
cubic yard weighs 3,800 pounds, which means that a total of 6,650 tons was moved to constitute the 
embankment. These statistics, which should be read as the equivalent of a technical description, such as 
oil on canvas or watercolor on paper, indicate scale.‘
9
 
Alloway had visited the site of Spiral Jetty no less than eleven times between June 1970 and 
April 1973. It is this experience of the work‘s emergence from the ground up that revealed 
the extent to which Smithson needed the skills and co-operation of others to overcome the 
project‘s ‗considerable technical difficulties‘.
10
 Twenty years later Jones had been cautious, 
and rightly so, about the hierarchy of so-called collaboration in an inherently capitalist 
economy. Nevertheless, she posits the emergence of Smithson‘s practice within the 
‗expanded studio‘ that is ‗shadowed‘ by the presence of other authors.
11
 I want to supplement 
Jones‘ argument, however, by looking beyond the economic value that capitalism places on 
labour.   
This line of enquiry has been enabled by the Royal Anthropological Institute‘s Huxley 
Memorial Lecture, On Human Correspondence, given by Tim Ingold in 2014.
12
 In the early 
phases of that presentation Ingold outlines Herbert Spencer‘s vision of social life. For 
Spencer the social world had been comprised of discrete individuals, or ‗blobs‘ as Ingold 
terms them, whose relationships were governed by self-interest and modelled on the 
operations of the market. ‗In the market‘, Ingold tells the audience ‗it is what changes hands 
that matters not the hands themselves. The handshake seals the contract but is the contract not 
a binding of lives in itself?‘ As he points out the etymological root of the term ‗contract‘ 
unites ‗con‘ meaning together and ‗trahere‘ meaning ‗to draw or pull.‘ For Ingold life is lived 





 Rather life is lived as multitude of lines, which unfurl and 
knot, braiding our becoming and potentialities with the lives of others. ‗Social life‘ he insists 
‗lies not in the solitary accretion of blobs but in the fluent correspondence of lines‘ and 
without it there can be ‗no life‘.
14
 
In Ingold‘s intertwined paradigms of social life and making, others may be instrumental to 
our being but not its instrument. The artist is not master of their materials or ideas but 
negotiates the emergence of the not yet known in response to the physical demands of the 
work‘s production. As Ingold succinctly expresses it: ‗concrete form does not issue from the 
idea.‘
15
 It is the question of cooperation and material handling which brings me, somewhat 
obliquely, to James Elkins‘ wonderful book What Painting Is (1999).
 16
 What calls Elkins to 
mind is his reference to the Latin definition of the word Labor. Elkins notes that the industrial 
revolution‘s reduction of the proletariat to a mass of exploitable energy has obscured a 
concept of labour ‗used to describe procedures, methods, and techniques—the daily struggle 
with materials.‘
17
 For Elkins, painting is a matter of pushing stones around a surface in a 
liquid suspension. Unlike the painters cited by Elkins, however, Smithson could not push his 
stones around alone. What is needed, therefore, is a model that rejects the oversimplified 
divorce of industry and craft, which views Parson‘s employees not as unthinking tools 
engaged in manual and mechanical labour in a preordained project, but as an instrumental 
workforce equipped with material intelligence.  
For that readers need look no further than Bob Phillips‘ account of the artist‘s first visits to 
Parson‘s Construction Company: 
‗He showed me the maps he had. And on those maps was a little J drawn, or little circles drawn on the 
bottom of it, very tiny. And, I said, ―No, that‘s not going to be good enough; we‘ve got to have some 
better drawings than that.‖ So he showed me some of the sketches that he‘d done. I was trying to 
convince him that he needed an engineer to do this, to prepare a design. ―Then I can give you a bid on 
constructing the Jetty and how it must be built.‖ I‘m not an engineer, but I tried very hard to make him 
think I was. I was trying to impress him with my knowledge of construction and that he was now in my 
domain—so he‘d better pay attention. (…) ―You‘ve got to have soil reports. The ground pressure out 
there is only two hundred PSI (pounds per square inch), and it won‘t support the construction equipment, 
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and you‘ve got to have design calculations in order to get it up to fifteen hundred PSI as required. It takes 
up one foot of fill to raise the ground pressure five hundred PSI. We may have to use track machines with 
cleats and widen the tracks in order to work on the soft surface […]‘ 
18
   
What Phillips made clear is that Smithson did not fully grasp the monumental nature of the 
forthcoming Salt Lake project. Indeed in early 1970 he described the construction of the 
earthwork as that which would be ‗built on a salt reef‘.
 19
 The ‗risks involved‘ in the project 
were revealed on the first day on site which ‗was almost the last […] the loader broke 
through the area where the solid salt bottom meets the sand of the beach. The creamy grey 
mud oozed and trapped the loader.‘
20
 The equipment was rescued due to the skills of Boozie 
and Roger the other loader driver. ‗Boozie‘, Phillips remembers, was a ‗marvel with that 
machine.‘
21
 So much so that he ‗wondered if the Jetty could have been built with anyone else 
but [Boozie] working on that dike and placing those rocks.‘
22
 Nevertheless, Phillips 
steadfastly maintains that Smithson made the Jetty. There were times when the artist‘s 
intuitive grasp of the site and ability to ‗conduct‘ the workers baffled Phillips; he seemed to 
have ‗all the answers‘. The radical change in the earthwork‘s form from its first incarnation, 
with a semi-spiral arc and a ‗bulb‘ at the end as seen in the photograph with Serra, to the 
costly remaking of Spiral Jetty as it exists today again underscores the emergence of art as 
the not yet known in the transformation of sketch on paper to rock, water, salt, and mud. 
What emerges from Phillips‘ fascinating account of the making of Spiral Jetty is a tangled 
knot of tacit knowledges, problems, solutions, agreements, conflicts and resolutions. This was 
not some sentimental, utopian vision of collaboration particularly because, at one point, 
Smithson wanted Boozie fired. But in handling the challenges that building the Jetty 
presented, Smithson and the workforce came to a mutual understanding via an intertwining of 
materials and movement. It is in the sensuous unfolding of that work‘s material processes, in 
the collective push and pull of matter, which Spiral Jetty and the social relationships 




In Smithson‘s economy of matter and time it is of crucial significance that, writing in 1972, 
he chose to document the people who had contributed to the direction and resolution of Spiral 
Jetty.
23
 His account does not just present a list of collaborators comprised of established 
artists like Nancy Holt or Richard Serra who already belonged to the ‗system‘ of the art world 
as Alloway described it.
24
 Rather it had been a meticulous naming of all the people who, in 
one way or another, contributed to the formation and construction of the earthwork and 
film.
25
 Smithson carefully recounts the ups and downs of his encounters that led him, 
eventually, to establish the site at Rozel Point. He names Ted Tuttle at Utah Park 
Development; Bill Holt, who had been ‗instrumental in building causeway‘ from Syracuse to 
Antelope Island; John Silver and his sons, who showed Smithson the only boat that would 
sail the Great Salt Lake; and Charles Stoddard, who had a barge on the north side of the cut 
off which Smithson had hoped to take before he found out that it had sunk.
26
 This catalogue 
of beginnings, comic errors, false starts, and ‗dead ends‘ underscores Smithson‘s 
commitment to art as the outcome of ‗a total engagement with the building process from the 
ground up and the sky down.‘
27
 Smithson‘s decision to embed the impact of these human 
relationships, these ‗tender‘ tendencies as he called them, in Spiral Jetty‘s film and text are 
testimony to the debt he felt to others.
28
 As such it marks the beginnings of what Timothy 
Martin called ‗Smithson‘s political turn‘, through which the artist repositioned his 
engagement with the social via the thinking of Martin Heidegger.
29
 By 1973, as Martin 
astutely points out, Smithson had mobilised his practice to critique capitalism‘s 
transformation of land and man into what Heidegger called ‗standing reserve‘ and instead 




The Spiral Jetty text, it can be argued, performs Ingold‘s thesis of lives lived as lines, which 
is also indebted to Heidegger‘s thought. The essay‘s attention to the unfolding of practice 
reveals the temporary intertwining of beings, a bond which is sustained and extended it by the 
sharing of this disclosure with the reader. In acknowledging this debt Smithson ensures the 
impact of Spiral Jetty on all of those involved in its emergence and in return the testimonies 
and sadly, the obituaries of Busenbark and Phillips are marked by the pride they felt in that 
involvement, their fondness for Smithson, and profound sense of loss at his passing.
30
  
What interests me is that this awareness of the dialectical relationship between beings and 
world emerged through the physical handling of matter. In other words, it is not something of 
which Smithson had always been aware. The pages that follow consider the way in which the 
historical and conceptual resources employed in Smithson‘s practice were diametrically 
opposed to the social dimension of his work. To reassert the impact of these pedestrian 
details, I argue, is to question the flow of discourse that has ensued from them and unseat the 
paradigm case of art‘s sublimation of the death drive.   
II Entropy and the Old Monuments        
Smithson began to think about the possibilities of earthworks in 1966. His published and 
unpublished writings from 1966–67 clearly identify his ‗urge towards civilised refuse‘, as he 
described it to Cummings in 1972, and pharonic ruins remained a lynch-pin in his practice at 
the time of Spiral Jetty‘s construction.
31
 As a prophecy of the fall of modern civilisation, the 
value of ancient Egypt‘s ruins appears to be self-evident for this artist‘s practice and a waste 
of ‗printed matter‘.
32
 To consider which pharonic monuments Smithson referred to, to what 
end, and how they were framed by the Egyptological scholarship of the time poses new 
questions for the direction and tenor of this artist‘s research. 
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Smithson‘s famous essay ‗Entropy and the New Monuments‘ had been published in Artforum 
June 1966. That text situated the aesthetic concerns of Smithson‘s contemporaries within a 
wider ‗architecture of entropy‘ made manifest in ‗the slurbs, urban sprawl, and the infinite 
number of housing developments of the postwar boom‘.
33
 He argued that the homogenisation 
of the life and landscape of America under the mantle of consumer capitalism had brought 
‗art to a new consciousness of the vapid and the dull‘.
34
 Artists responded in kind, providing 
‗a visible analog for the Second Law of Thermodynamics,‘ which as Smithson explained 
‗extrapolates the range of entropy by telling us energy is more easily lost [sic] than obtained, 
that in the ultimate future the whole universe will burn out and be transformed into an all-
encompassing sameness‘.
35
 This text, together with A Tour of the Monuments of Passaic, 
New Jersey, once again published in Artforum December 1967, locates Smithson‘s interest in 
entropy on home ground. Those sites contained what Smithson called ‗ruins in reverse, that is 
– all the new construction that would eventually be built. This is the opposite of the 
―romantic ruin‖‘, he continued: 
‗because the buildings don‘t fall into ruin after they are built but they rather rise into ruin before they are 
built. The anti-romantic mise-en-scene suggests the discredited idea of time and many other ‗out of date‘ 
things. But the suburbs exist without a rational past and without the ‗big events‘ of history.‘
36
     
 
I believe that two ancient Egyptian monuments had been instrumental to Smithson‘s 
theorisation of the ruin in reverse. The first, The Pyramid of Meidum, is represented in a 
small west section diagram, which features in the margins of ‗Quasi-infinities and the waning 
of space‘ published in Artnews in November 1966 (fig.4). The artist reproduced this image 
from I. E. S. Edwards‘ The Pyramids of Ancient Egypt (1947) and this diagram should, 
therefore, be supplemented by the black and white photograph of the same monument, The 
Pyramid of Meidum, View from the East (c.2600 BCE, fig.5), which also appears in the same 
book. The second monument is the Great Pyramid at Giza (c.2560BCE), which features 
prominently in Smithson‘s unpublished essay ‗The Artist as Site-Seer or, A Dintorphic 






The opening passages of ‗Quasi-infinities‘ describe it as ‗four blocks of print‘ supplemented 
‗ultramundane margins‘ that contain footnotes and images.
38
 The body text may be linear but 
the reader‘s focus is persistently unsettled as it moves back and forth between the different 
modes of printed matter. It is within this hurly-burly of art criticism, history, physics, and 
contemporary art that Smithson makes a connection between entropy and the aesthetic 
vocabulary of ancient Egypt. The artist mobilises the ‗static‘ nature of Egyptian artefacts 
which, unlike the ‗dynamism‘ of Greek sculpture, failed to act as precedents to the protocols 
of realism that governed the development of the Western canon.
39
 Instead, the stasis of 
Egyptian art confined it to the ruins of that ancient culture, rendering it a problematic entropic 
presence within the developmental chronologies forged by the museum. And for Smithson 
the discrete death of Pharonic culture runs parallel to the second law of thermodynamics: 
‗what William S Burroughs calls ―The Thermo–dynamic Pain and Energy Bank‖ – a 
condition of time that originates inside isolated objects rather than outside‘.
40
  
Viewed through this prism, Ancient Egypt presents a paradigm case for null civilisation. 
Smithson mobilised ancient Egypt‘s capacity to turn in on itself to discuss the work of his 
contemporaries. We are told that Eva Hesse, Ruth Vollmer, and Lucas Samaras are making 
‗solid objects that contain ―ideas of time.‖‘
41
 Rather than a collection of finished objects 
destined for the deathly preservation of the museum, their work had been indebted to 
processes without a future. As he notes in ‗Quasi-infinities,‘ in reference to Obelisk, made by 
Ruth Volmer (1962), ‗matter‘ in this work ‗opposes all activity–its future is missing.‘
42
 
Hesse‘s work, according to the same essay, had been ‗vertiginous and wonderfully dismal‘:  
‗Trellises are mummified, nets contain desiccated lumps, wires extend from tightly wrapped frameworks, 
a cosmic dereliction is the general effect. Coils go on and on; some are cracked open, only to reveal an 
empty centre. Such ―things‖ seem destined for a funerary chamber that excludes all mention of the living 
and the dead. Her art brings to mind the obsession of the pharaohs, but in this case the anthropomorphic 
measure is absent. Nothing is incarnated into nothing. Human decay is nowhere in evidence.‘
43





Edwards‘ cross-section of the Meidum pyramid appears on the first page of ‗Quasi-infinities.‘ 
It provides a compelling supplement to Smithson‘s text because this ‗reproduced 
reproduction‘ indexes the monumental failure of a monument.
44
As the photograph and 
description of the Meidum pyramid in Edwards‘ text reveals, this twentieth-century diagram 
is the only completed form in which the pyramid appears.
45
 The temple‘s construction is 
believed to have begun during the reign of Huni (c.2637–2613 BCE), last king of the 3
rd
 
Dynasty, and continued into the reign of his son, Sneferu (2613–2589 BCE), first king of the 
4
th
 Dynasty. Although this step pyramid is credited to a successor of the pioneering architect 
and polymath Imhotep (2650–2600 BCE), the numerous changes to the design made by 
Sneferu‘s architects led Meidum‘s structure to become unstable and it collapsed during 
construction.
46
 Edwards‘ diagram shows the remaining superstructure and the outlines of the 
three different pyramids that the workforce attempted to erect on this site.  
At the time of its publication The Pyramids of Egypt was part of a historical project dedicated 
to unearthing the great deeds of kings rather than those of the pyramid makers.
47
 Meidum 
never fulfilled its function for the pharaoh. Through Smithson‘s entropic lens, Meidum offers 
an archetypal example of the ultimate impotence of the power of civilisation, of inbuilt, if 
unwitting, obsolescence: an apotheosis of the collapse of matter and meaning. As Smithson 
notes his Scrapbook in November 1972, ‗buildings [are] visualisations of power, people visit 
obsolete civilisations to get gratification from the collapse of architecture‘.
48
 The conceptual 
value of the Meidum pyramid draws into view a formal affinity between it and Smithson‘s 
1967 drawing The Museum of the Void (fig8). The drawing echoes the perspective and 
superstructural outline of the photograph of Meidum in Edwards‘ text, and combines it with 
the stepped form of the pyramid‘s first and second failed versions. It is the physical and 
symbolic collapse of the Meidum pyramid, its inability to embody the ‗big events of history‘ 
12 
 
in ‗Quasi-Infinities‘ and The Museum of the Void that leads me to posit it in many, but not all, 
respects as a precedent for the ‗monuments‘ described in Smithson‘s 1967 tour of his birth 
place, Passaic, New Jersey.  
True to the contradictory tenor of Smithson‘s practice, however, the model of monumental 
failure afforded by the pyramid at Meidum is curiously concomitant with Smithson‘s interest 
in the ‗immobile‘ and ‗indestructible‘ Great Pyramid at Giza, which is key to ‗The Artist as 
Site-Seer‘.
49
 Again Smithson‘s thesis is indebted to thermodynamics and the thinking of 
George Kubler:       
‗The Great Pyramid would qualify as a prime object […] it is an agglomeration of codes and puzzles, 
clocks, tombic theories, secret passages, and lacunary mathematics. The Great Pyramid does not exist in 
terms of character or individual, but as a ―semblance.‖ Like Stonehenge, it is an awesome computer, 
based on orbital chronologies and shifting calendars. The purpose of the Great Pyramid was defined by 
the Hebrews centuries ago–the name they gave it ―Urim–middin‖=―Light–Measures,‖ and the 
Phoenicians called it ―Baal–Middon‖=‖The Lord of the Measures.‖ Greek ―Pyra-midos,‖ ―Pyra–mid.‖ A 




The prime object, Smithson explains in a particularly dense passage, ‗becomes the prime 
number if seen as ―monument of measures.‖ The prime number only refers to itself or 1 and 
is in a way like the Kantian ―thing in itself‖‘.
51
 The ‗monument of measures‘, which 
Smithson amalgamates from Hebrew and Greek via what he terms ‗linguistic drift‘, thus 
directly invokes the collapse of meaning inherent within the self-referential potential of 
Spiral Jetty and his Non-Sites.
52
  
It is in this context that Edwards‘ description of the Great Pyramid in the Pyramids of Egypt 
demands closer inspection, even more so if the ‗monument of measures‘ is viewed in tandem 
with Smithson‘s fascination with the physicality of printed matter. Edwards tells the reader 
that Khufu‘s temple had been the ‗apogee of Pyramid-building in respect of both size and 
quality‘.
53
 No ‗exact computation‘ of its mass had been possible to date but it had been 
estimated that 2,300,000 separate blocks of hewn stone form the Great Pyramid at Giza:
54
      
‗No monument in Egypt has been surveyed and measured so often and with so much care as the Great 
Pyramid […] From this survey [of 1925] it was ascertained that the following were the original 
13 
 
measurements of the four sides of the base: north, 755.43 feet; South, 756.08 feet; east, 755.88 feet; west, 
755.77 feet. While, therefore no two sides were absolutely identical in length, the difference between the 
longest and the shortest was only 7.9 inches. Each side was orientated exactly with true north and south 
or east and west, the following being the estimated errors; north side, 2‘ 28‖ south of west; south side, 1‘ 
57‖ south of west; east side, 5‘ 30‖ west of north; west side, 2‘ 30‖ west of north. As the accuracy of this 
orientation implies, the four corners were almost perfect right angles, their exact measurements being: 
north-east 90° 3‘ 2‖; north-west, 89° 59‘ 58‖; south-east, 89° 56‘ 27‖; south-west 90° 0‘ 33‖. When 
complete, it rose to a height of 481.4 feet, the top 31 feet of which are now missing. Its four sides incline 
at an angle of about 51° 52‘ to the ground. The area covered by its base is 13.1 acres.‘
55
      
 
Edwards‘ inscription of carved matter unravels in print, becomes vertiginous, homogenous, 
unfathomable. When spoken, the performative rhythm of the text implicates this ‗monument 
of measures‘ within the mapping and construction of The Spiral Jetty. As Smithson says in 
the film‘s 1972 monologue:  
‗TOWNSHIP 8 NORTH OF RANGE 7 WEST OF THE SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN: 
 
Unsurveyed land on the bed of the Great Salt Lake, if surveyed would be described as follows.  
Beginning at a point South 3000 feet and West 800 feet from the Northeast Corner of Section 8, 
Township 8 North, Range 7 West; thence South 45 degrees West 651 feet; thence North 60 degrees West 
651 feet; thence North 45 degrees East 651 feet; thence Southeasterly along the meander line 675 feet to 
the point of beginning. Containing 10 acres, more or less.‘  
 
 
For Smithson, the monuments of ancient Egypt, to recall ‗Quasi-Infinities‘, presented sites in 
which ‗human decay‘ had been ‗nowhere in evidence. Nothing is incarnated into nothing‘.
56
 
Devoid of human and animal life they turned in on themselves, had no other referents than 
stone and time: an exhausted civilisation par excellence.  
Robert Smithson had visited the pyramids outside New Mexico in 1957 and journeyed to 
Rome in 1961 but he never travelled to Egypt. His engagement with pharonic culture had 
been conducted through the twin media of reproduction and discourse. It is at this point that 
my critique of his treatment of these monuments begins to take shape. What seals ancient 
Egypt‘s fitness for the allegory of entropy is the emptiness that marks the black and white 
photographs of its ruins which had been at Smithson‘s disposal. That deserted state is an 




Recent scholarship in Egyptology, in particular the writing of Eliot Colla in his Conflicted 
Antiquities: Egyptology, Egyptomania and Egyptian Modernity (2007), and Peter Champion 
and T. C. Ucko‘s The Wisdom of Egypt: Changing Visions through the Ages (2003), have 
carefully plotted the impact of colonialism on the representation of Egypt during the early 
phases of Modernity. Ucko and Champion carefully argue the figure of Egyptian ruins 
became increasingly popular after the French Revolution, as Europeans imagined a series of 
‗apocalyptic visions‘ of the future.
57
 When Jean-François Champollion deciphered the 
hieroglyphs on the Rossetta Stone in 1822 this new knowledge about Egypt‘s ruined past 
bolstered European claims to govern modern Egypt and preserve its antiquities.
 58
 As Edward 
Said argued in his classic text Orientalism, the British Mandate over Egypt (1882–1954) had 
been legitimated by ‗knowledge from above‘.
59
 Not only were the present, indigenous 
inhabitants of Egypt deemed unfit to govern themselves, but they were also seen to have 
neither the technical facility nor the interest, beyond plunder, to look after the nation‘s 
antiquities. In a letter to Champollion dated January 1829 Étienne Pariset wrote: 
‗You are admiring the miracles of ancient Egypt, we scrutinise the infinite abominations of modern 
Egypt! How far one is removed from the other! The more I think about it the more I am astonished by the 
antiquity of Egypt, its wisdom, genius, knowledge and power. And the more I see, the more I am 
convinced that modern-day Egypt should be placed at the centre of the type of nations that one should 
mistrust and flee from.‘
60
 
    
Modern American and European travellers likened Egypt‘s modern population to ‗animals‘ 
and could see little relation ‗between the present-day Egyptians and the people responsible 
for the construction of the monuments they came to see‘.
61
  
Eliot Colla underscores this crucial point by drawing particular attention to the popular 
lithographs of Royal Academician David Roberts (1796–1864), which had consistently 
pictured Egypt‘s modern inhabitants as peasants, draped around ancient monuments in such a 
way as to ‗communicate indifference and neglect‘.
62
 The ‗degradation‘ of the ruins in the 
‗present‘ was believed to ‗shame [the] glories of the past‘.
63
 Thus colonial rule constructed a 
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vision of a glorious but deserted and, consequently, utterly failed civilisation; ‗an empty 
place, lost in time‘
64
 that had succumbed to the ‗inevitable process of entropy.‘
65
  
While for Smithson ancient Egypt prophesied the futility of all action, the ‗philosophical 
imperative‘ of the Islamic poetic tradition marks its mediations on loss as a loss in and of the 
social.
66
 As the thirteenth-century poet Jamal al-Dinal-Idrisi makes clear, what shaped 
encounters with pharaonic ruins was their capacity to act as a trace of the lives and 
communities that made, grew, and lived with the monuments: ‗Where is he among whose 




Joann Fletcher draws on recent archaeological findings to answer some of these questions in 
her new book The Story of Egypt (2015). In that text she discusses an excavation in 1988 that 
uncovered ‗600 small tombs of the Giza workers‘ known as the ‗Gerget Khufu‘ or ‗settlement 
of Khufu‘. Amongst the finds were the names and artefacts belonging to the ‗overseer 
Ptahshepsesu‘ and ‗the weaver Neferhetpes‘. She continues: 
‗Other such texts give official titles from the ‗Overseer of Masonry‘ and ‗Director of Draughtsmen‘ to 
the ‗Priestess of Hathor‘, the ‗weaver‘, ‗baker‘, ‗potter‘ and ‗carpenter‘, the artist Peteti protecting his 
modest tomb with the imaginative curse ―Listen all of you! The priest of Hathor will beat twice any of 




It is estimated that it took ten years to build Khufu‘s temple at Giza. During that time Giza 
had been populated by four thousand skilled paid worker gangs, such as the ‗Friends of 
Khufu,‘ some of whom ‗added their names in red graffiti within the pyramid as they were 
building, albeit discreetly hidden from view‘.
69
 In The Great Pyramid: Ancient Egypt 
Revisited, (2007) John Romer agrees that far more is known about the pyramid-makers than 
the age of Khufu and his court:
70
  
‗Millions of their careful chisel-marks still flicker over the great stones they cut and shaped – the marks 
of living hands at work – and there are many further traces too of the connected labours of surveying and 
design. And in the stone quarry to the south of the Great Pyramid the ancient chisel-cuts that stripe the 
cliffs still measure out in the line of their arc the spans of individual arms and shoulders and, in the 
disjunction of these patterns, their hourly progress at the rock face. Deep trenches in this quarry held the 





Colla argues that after their production, the pharonic ‗ruins served as figures of memory, 
writing and the possibility of culture‘ for Egypt‘s indigenous peoples.
72
 In direct contrast to 
Smithson‘s position, contemporary Egyptology emphasises the way in which the pyramids 
entreat onlookers to muse on the greatness of human endeavour in the fields of science and 
engineering rather than focus wholly on the passing of time. Colla carefully unpacks Idrisi‘s 
use of the term ‗wonder (al-‘ajiba)‘ which combines the verb ‗to consider‘ and the object of 
consideration to underline the significance of the pyramids for the faith and future of Egypt‘s 
inhabitants.
73
 He writes: ‗insofar as wondrous monuments, such as the pyramids, trigger the 
sensual experience of wonder and the cultivation of a sense of wonder (ta’ajjub), they 
provoke meditation, on both the objects of the created world and the intellect which 
contemplates the world‘.
74
   
To reappraise Smithson‘s vision of Egypt through the postcolonial lens afforded by Colla, 
Romer et al is to reveal the circumscription of its monuments by the medium of reproduction 
and the discourses that shaped that nation‘s history. The significance pyramid‘s production in 
in Idrisi‘s text reminds the viewer that to seek gratification from fallen civilisations is to fix 
them at a specific distance and absent the time of its previous and present cohabitants and, 
with them, the time of its makers. In other words, Smithson‘s analysis of the Great Pyramid 
as a prime object in 1966-67 goes against the grain of the philosophy of making that spans his 
practice.  
III Spiral Jetty and the Death Drive  
The third and final section of this essay builds on Smithson‘s remote engagement with the 
monuments of ancient Egypt to illuminate the framework that the death drive constructs for 
Spiral Jetty. Smithson remained steadfast in his commitment to psychoanalysis right up until 





interests me, however, is the point at which Freud‘s thinking, Smithson‘s thinking, and the 
artist‘s practice part company. The social relations embedded in Spiral Jetty‘s construction 
and reception, I want to argue, offer the means with which to critique the death drive‘s ability 
to articulate the complexity of artistic production and reception. The first step in this process 
is to map Smithson‘s engagement with Freud‘s thesis and the way in which it frames 
understandings of this artwork. The second step is to then ask, what does the death drive do 
to Spiral Jetty?  
Throughout his career Smithson deplored art criticism‘s indifference to artistic process. In 
‗The Sedimentation of the Mind: Earth Projects‘ (1968) he mobilises psychoanalysis as a 
critical tool to resist that bias. He reclaims the ‗time of the artist‘ via a combination of two 
important resources: Tony Smith‘s experience on the unfinished New Jersey Turnpike that 
had featured in Artforum in 1966 and Anton Ehrenzweig‘s Hidden Order of Art (1967). 
Smith had taken a ride on a dark night with three of his Cooper Union students along the 
unfinished road in 1951. The absence of street lighting and road markers took Smith into the 
endless realm of the Kantian Sublime, questioning the conventional limits of art. Smithson 
read this experience through the prism of psychoanalysis as a means to circumvent the 
preoccupation with the end game of art and instead foreground ‗the state of mind in the 
―primary process‖ of making contact with matter‘
76
:  
‗This process is called by Anton Ehrenzweig ―dedifferentiation,‖ and it involves a suspended question 





Smithson‘s familiarity with the ideas expressed in Civilisation and Its Discontents is evident 
in the annotations in the artist‘s Scrapbook (1966–1972) that critique the operations of the 
museum.
78
 For the majority of artists and thinkers interested in the death drive the primary 
text is Freud‘s speculative essay ‗Beyond the Pleasure Principle‘, written in 1920. Smithson‘s 
focus on Freud‘s more strident essay of 1930 is interesting, however, because it leaves the 
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reader in no doubt of the death drive‘s most radical proposition. As Laplanche and Pontalis 
note, it transforms self-aggression into the ‗very essence of all aggressiveness‘.
79
 Freud says: 
‗The views that I have developed [in Civilisation and Its Discontents] were first put forward only 
tentatively, but in the course of time they have taken such a hold on me that I can no longer think in any 
other way. In my view they are theoretically far more serviceable than any others one might entertain; 
they produce what we strive for in scientific work – a simple answer that neither neglects nor does 
violence to the facts. I recognise that we have always seen sadism and masochism as manifestations of 
the destructive drive, directed outwards or inwards and strongly alloyed with eroticism, but I can no 
longer understand how we could have ignored the ubiquity of non-erotic aggression and destruction and 
failed to accord it its due place in the interpretation of life.‘
80
   
 
With great acuity, Smithson‘s sketchbook situated the genesis of psychoanalysis as an index 
of ‗modern man‘s‘ turning away from twentieth-century life: ‗confronted by the new realities 
of industrialisation, he preoccupied himself with primativity and [the] unconscious‘.
81
 The 
opening passages of Civilisation and Its Discontents rail against modernity and set up an 
antagonistic binary between the will of civilisation and the archaic, destructive desires of the 
individual. As he stated in ‗The Future of an Illusion‘ (1927) Freud believes that civilisation 
maintains power by curbing the ‗liberty‘ of individuals, ‗coercing‘ them into unnatural social 
relationships outside their kinship groups.
82
 In one of the most brutal passages of Civilisation 
and Its Discontents Freud insists: 
‗Human beings are not gentle creatures in need of love, at most able to defend themselves if attacked; on 
the contrary, they can count a powerful share of aggression among their instinctual endowments. Hence, 
their neighbour is not only a potential helper or sexual object, but also someone who tempts them to take 
out their aggression on him, to exploit his labour without recompense, to use him sexually without his 




Made bold by Thomas Hobbes famous dictum ‗Homo homini lupus [man is a wolf to man]‘,
84
 
Freud reasoned that people would be far happier if they rejected religion‘s call to love thy 
neighbour and instead embraced the ‗primitive conditions‘ which give free reign to the ‗brute 
force‘ of their inherent animal aggressivity.
85
 At the level of the individual the death drive‘s 
formulation depends upon the psychic apparatus outlined in Freud‘s Second Topography of 
the Ego, Super-ego, and the Id. The death drive inhabits the Id: the most archaic unconscious 
part of the psyche whose motives and effects evade the detection of the subject. As such 





 It is this ‗fundamental hostility of human beings to one another‘ that leaves 
‗civilised society‘ under constant threat of disintegration.
87
  
The fraught relationship that Freud imagines between individuals and the social world is 
indebted to his formulation of the human subject a discrete being.  First and foremost, the 
death drive is the will of the individual to return to an originary state of zero tension. In 
Civilisation and Its Discontents Freud posits ‗art‘ and ‗scholarly activity‘ as instruments of 
this state; they are ‗palliative measures‘ that bring temporary ‗pleasure and consolation‘ via a 
sensation of ‗mild narcosis.‘
88
 Crucially Freud‘s model of the psychic apparatus is an 
economic one and hails from its key determinant, which Freud articulates as the flow of 
‗excitation‘ or ‗energy.‘ Low levels of excitation or energy are conducive to ‗stability‘ and 
thus pleasure whereas a large influx of excitation ‗floods the ego‘ bringing about ‗instability‘ 
and an experience of ‗unpleasure.‘ These ideas, as Freud acknowledges, build on G. E. 
Fechner‘s ‗principle of constancy.‘
89
 For Freud this archaic desire is indicative of:  
‗An urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state of things which the living entity has been 
obliged to abandon under the pressure of external disturbing forces; that is, it is a kind of organic 
elasticity, or, to put it another way, the expression of the inertia inherent in organic life.‘
90
          
 
The biologism that shapes Freud‘s thinking, as Ehrenzweig acknowledges, is derived from 
German Biologist Ernst Haeckle‘s evolutionary concept of phylogeny.
91
 Haeckle 
hypothesised that the gestation of human embryos repeated, or recapitulated, each 
evolutionary phase of the species. The significance of this idea for Freud, often expressed as 
‗phylogeny begets ontogeny,‘ had been two-fold: it situates the evolution of human 
subjectivity in relation to its animal ancestry and pre-organic development as inert matter. 
Freud reasoned that the residue of that archaic experience is retained in the deepest recesses 
of the unconscious. As he continues in Beyond the Pleasure Principle the drive toward inertia 
is ‗conservative‘, signalling a return to an ‗old state of things‘; 
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‗Everything living dies for internal reasons – becomes inorganic once again – then we shall be compelled 





This blurring of the human and the animal is indicative of Freud‘s debt to Darwin and his 
secularism, which differentiates his ideas from the dualism that characterises the majority of 
the Western Philosophical tradition critiqued by Derrida in The Animal that therefore I am 
([1997] 2007).
93
 As ethologist and primatologist Frans de Waal has argued, Freud‘s equation 
of the animal and aggressivity remains trapped within a rationalist philosophical paradigm.
94
  
It is the thesis of a return to an inorganic state, what Smithson referred to as the ‗desiccation 
of the organic‘
95
 and the remoteness of Spiral Jetty that led Iversen to propose that Spiral 
Jetty enacted a ‗symbolic ritual‘ that gave ‗temporary sway to the death drive.‘
96
  
‗Because of the earthwork‘s extreme inaccessibility, all most of us are ever likely to experience of the 
work are the filmic, photographic, and literary versions. But these, it seems to me, have the weight and 
interest they do precisely because they circle around the vortex created by this great lost object. As Eva 
Schmidt points out, the last image of a black-and-white photograph over the editing table – drained of 




Iversen‘s argument is framed by Freud‘s conception of the discrete subject and one of 
Gorgoni‘s photographs of the vacant Jetty, enabling her to suggest that this great lost object 
refuses the ‗communal function‘ of religion.
98
 As such, her argument is consistent with 
Smithson‘s Scrapbook (1966–1973) which draws on Civilisation and Its Discontents to note 
that ‗controlled by capital and politics‘, there are parallels between the ‗function of [the] 
museum as ―establishment‖‘, which causes ‗discontent‘ and how ‗religion used methods to 
control‘.
99
 For Smithson the museum‘s defining characteristic was its ‗nullity‘, which 
divested its collections of their ‗charged‘ relationship to the outside world.
100
 While that 
‗nullity‘ had possibilities for art practice as the Museum of the Void proposes, ultimately the 
establishment would win the day and a more ‗extreme‘ position was necessary: the remote 
monument.
101
 What strikes me is that an analysis of the work as an irretrievable absence loses 







Like Smithson‘s engagement with the pharonic ruins of Egypt this argument only sees the 
work from the sky down. Without the oscillation between containment and limitlessness, the 
‗matter of looking‘ and ‗matter of touching‘, irretrievable absence foregrounds one kind of 
ever increasing distance.
103 
As Smithson said ‗if you are immersed in a flood you can drown, 
so it is wiser to perceive it from a distance. Yet, on the other hand, it is worth something to be 
swept away from time to time.
104
 In the economy of absence embodied sensory experience is 
historicised, however, and becomes circumscribed as an operation of the mind that cannot 
sustain its connection to the world of matter. As a result the process of dissolution does not 
loom large as an apocalyptic vision of the present or future. Rather it is objectified, reduced 
to an anodyne time of the past and the pages of art‘s histories that can be assimilated by the 
establishment it sought to resist.
105
 In other words, if the work loses its relationship to the 
ground it is disconnected from its charged relationship to the present. 
In 1971, prior to the rise in the lake‘s waters, Smithson applied to the State of Utah to 
purchase a perpetual lease to protect the ongoing financial investment necessary to the 
‗maintenance‘ of the site.
106
 The rationale for this investment, he argued, had been to 
‗preserve it for future generations.‘
107
 Smithson pledged that his meeting with State officials, 
in which he planned to screen the film, would ‗elucidate‘ the ‗meaning of the work and its 
relevance for Utah and the world at large‘.
108
 The re-emergence of Spiral Jetty in 1997 and its 
management by the Dia Foundation has reasserted the dialectical, material play of its versions 
and with it the tactile experience of the work on the ground. As Ann Reynolds wrote in her 
significant corrective to the myth of the work‘s inaccessibility in 2005:   
‗An ever-increasing number of individuals have […] travelled to the Jetty, proving that it is not in fact so 
remote, and once there many visitors have produced new images, new descriptions of an unexpectedly 
white spiral encrusted and partially filled with salt crystals. Because of the Jetty’s accessibility and these 
fresh descriptions, no one can have the luxury of thinking that the earlier, presubmergence descriptions 






Just a few clicks on Google Earth, Instagram, Tripadvisor, or YouTube and instead of a 
frozen black and white vision of homeostasis, Spiral Jetty forms a somewhat ethereal 
backdrop to family snaps and videos: walks with the dog, commissioned engagement 
photographs, fashion shoots and, of course, more knowingly ‗artistic‘ representations 
(fig.7).
110
 At the time of writing in 2017, YouTube features a video with a sound track by The 
Boards of Canada in which a swimmer gently floats by the Spiral Jetty in the Great Lake‘s 
saline waters.
111
 While the cost of journeying to Rozel Point may remain prohibitive for those 
not native to the State of Utah, and poorly paid art historians, the earthwork not only has an 
audience but is part of the modern day folklore and community of Box Elder County. As 
Observer journalist Stuart Husband recollected during his journey to the Jetty in 2004: 
‗We pull into the nearest gas station, 30 miles away. ―Going to the jetty?‖ asks the woman at the till, 
seeing me load up with water and granola bars. ―We get people coming in here all the time and asking 
the way. I went out there last summer. It‘s …‖ she searches for the right words to express the jetty‘s 




It can be argued that this this new era of access and dissemination has led, to borrow from 
Adorno‘s vocabulary, to the deaestheticization of the artwork. The all-consuming 
homogenisation of consumer culture driven by social media has imbued the work with a 
different kind of nullity.
113
 To my way of thinking, what is more compelling is that this 
documentation reveals that the ‗individuals‘ that tread upon the earthwork do not do so 
discretely. The shared ‗on-the-spot‘ experience of Spiral Jetty‘s audience causes subjects to 
flitter between viewer, subject, and participant. They are at once alone and in the company of 
others, negotiating an embodied relationship with the work and one another.
114
  
I want, just for a moment, to follow the death drive‘s most radical proposition to the letter. In 
this new shared economy, the frustration of this narcotic longing would posit Spiral Jetty as 
an active agent in the production of aggression. Freud‘s belief that self-aggression is the basis 
of all aggressivity means that the viewer stood on the Jetty must not allow welcome the 





 In phantasy at least, viewers take ‗possession‘ of the work by psychically killing off 
the other. If the hypothesis of the death drive is adopted in its entirety, Spiral Jetty acts as a 
dissolution machine that leaves ‗civilised society‘ under constant threat of disintegration.
116
 It 
is my contention that the emergence of Spiral Jetty in and of the social makes this hypothesis 
unsustainable because the death drive‘s contempt for the other demands a falsification of the 
circumstances of artistic production in order to perpetuate the rejection of the social via its 
reception.   
It is on the ground of Spiral Jetty that Freud‘s thought and Smithson‘s practices differ from 
each other. Without doubt, Freud‘s thinking provided a framework with which Smithson 
could construct a response to the intense crises that gripped America in the late 60s and early 
70s, what he named the ‗political whirlpool.‘
117
 Nowhere is this clearer that in ‗Art and 
Politics: A Symposium‘, published in Artforum in September 1970 when Smithson wrote 
‗perhaps‘ artists were now engaged with politics because ‗like anybody else [they] yearn for 
that unbearable situation that politics leads to: the threat of pain, the horror of annihilation, 
that would end in calm and peace.‘
118
 America seemed to be engulfed in a ‗hurricane of 
carnage‘ but while the artist wanted to ‗separate the liberating revolution from the repressive 
war machine […] he discovers that real revolution means violence too.‘
119
 These reflections 
must be situated in response to the events of May 1970, the month in which Spiral Jetty had 
been completed and four unarmed students were shot dead and nine others injured on the 
campus of Kent State University.
120
  
Smithson had spent a week as artist-in-residence at Kent State in January 1970. He gave 
lectures and studio crits but the final outcome of that stay had been the Partially Buried 
Woodshed (1970, fig.8) which had emerged through collaboration with students.
121
 Smithson 
had arrived on site with a plan for a work in the lineage of Concrete Pour and Glue Pour but 
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using mud; the only trouble was the Ohio winter had frozen the ground solid. Full of flu 
Smithson was all set to return to New York but, as sculpture professor Brinsley Tyrrell 
remembered, the students would not let him. Instead ‗they came out to the house and sat 
about on the living room floor and talked about what else they could do. ―Well said 
Smithson, he has always liked the idea of burying a building‖‘.
122
 So Smithson and the 
students worked together clearing and burying the site.
123
 A few weeks later, in February, 
Smithson was in Utah finalising the site for Spiral Jetty.        
On May 4
th
 1940 the Ohio National Guard opened fire on a student protest against Nixon‘s 
planned invasion of Cambodia which seemed to break the president‘s commitment to scale 
down American military action. Jeffery Miller and Sandra Scheuer aged twenty, and Allison 
Krause and William Schroeder aged just 19 were one hundred meters away from the National 
Guard when they were killed, sending shockwaves through America; more so Nancy Holt 
recalled, than the assassination of Kennedy.
124
 In the July of that year ‗May 4 Kent 70‘ was 
anonymously written on the work, which as Holt said made the ‗cracked‘ structure of the 
shed roof synonymous with the cracks in the country.
125
 It is this ‗disgust‘ which can be felt 
in ‗Art and Politics‘ when Smithson describes the bottomless whirlpool whose ‗political 
centrifugal force that throws the blood of atrocities onto those working for peace.‘
126
 The 
violence at Kent State radically ruptured the romanticism of the subject‘s Dionysian 
unravelling configured by the death drive. Instead it made the human cost of revolution 
tangible, painful, and terrifying. Without the luxury of a safe distance it really did feel as if 
civilisation were being swept away, not by the acts of individuals but by the ‗terrorism‘ of the 
state.
127
 Viewed in this light Spiral Jetty is at once a physical articulation of that terror but 
also of the independence of individuals from the apparatus of the state; what actually sustains 
civilisation is therefore day-to-day cooperation of individuals on the ground.  
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Had Smithson lived another three years, to see Richard Dawkins‘ publication of The Selfish 
Gene (1976), he could have perhaps found a different evolutionary vocabulary for the social 
dimension of his practice. Contrary to Freud‘s vision of Godless brute humanity Dawkins 
attributed altruism beyond kinship groups and the imperatives of religion to shared genes and 
their unceasing bid to survive. This focus on prosocial behaviour has been taken up in game 
theory in Robert Axelrod‘s ground breaking The Evolution of Cooperation (1984), while 
more recently the work of Andrew Coleman and colleagues argue that cooperation does not 
emerge from conscious or rational decision making.
128
 It is therefore possible to argue that 
the reciprocity of human relations is not the outcome of civilisation‘s coercion of the 
consciousness of the individual as Freud surmised. To my way of thinking, the emergence of 
Spiral Jetty and the social relationships to which it was indebted reveal this and more. As 
Smithson observed ‗nobody can face the absolute limit of death‘ and for my money that 
includes Freud.
129
 If the subject remains an island in the sea of the social, the betrayal, 
rejection, loss, or wounding of the other does not matter. What is most terrifying about death 
is not that we will cease to be but that we will cease to be with those we love.  
Conclusion 
This essay has framed the emergence of Spiral Jetty as the product of a generative, 
speculative process in which the logic of the work had been revealed and tested through 
material form. Ingold‘s braiding of making and social life brings the essential role of others to 
the foreground of that form. Smithson‘s remote engagement with pharonic monuments and 
documentation of the social beginnings of Spiral Jetty highlights a shift in the artist‘s 
practice. The conceptual framework of the death drive cannot adequately articulate this 
complex weave of materials and forces because art it is an inherently asocial framework. To 
abstract aggression into the long view of inherent ‗primitive drives‘ denies the significance of 
circumstance and the responsibility of the subject, which is to remain complicit with it not 
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critique it. Viewed from the political whirlpool of 2017 it seems to me that advocating a 
thesis which perpetuates narratives of individualism and protectionism is nothing less than 
irresponsible. To reject Freud‘s hypothesis of the death drive is not to disavow either the 
aggression that marks contemporary civilisation or art‘s capacity to exceed the confines of 
pleasure. On the contrary, it is to enable artists to engage seriously with the social dimensions 
of aesthetic experience and the impact of cooperation and aggression in that nexus.   
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